历史决定论的贫困

历史决定论的贫困 (1957)

The Poverty of Historicism
作者
卡尔·波普尔
首版
1957 年
国家/地区
英国
Open Library
45 个版本

百科

这个词条暂时没有中文维基百科条目,下面是英文维基百科的内容(英文原文):

The Poverty of Historicism is a 1944 book by the philosopher Karl Popper (revised in 1957), in which the author argues that the idea of historicism is dangerous and bankrupt.

Publication

The Poverty of Historicism was first written as a paper which was read in 1936, then updated, published in a series of articles in Economica in 1944, and published as a book in English in 1957. It was dedicated “In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victim to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny.” The title is a reference to Marx's book The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), itself a reference to Proudhon's book The Philosophy of Poverty (1846).

Synopsis

The book is a treatise on scientific method in the social sciences. Popper defines historicism as “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim…”. He also remarks that “[t]he belief … that it is the task of the social sciences to lay bare the law of evolution of society in order to foretell its future… might be described as the central historicist doctrine.”

Popper distinguishes two main strands of historicism, a “pro-naturalistic” approach which “favours the application of the methods of physics” and the “anti-naturalistic” approach which opposes these methods. The first two parts of the book contain Popper's exposition of historicist views (both pro- and anti-naturalistic), and the second two parts contain his criticism of them. Popper concludes by contrasting the antiquity of historicism (which, for example, Plato is said to have espoused) with the claims of modernity made by its twentieth-century adherents.

Popper's criticism of historicism

Popper's critique of the poverty of the idea of historical prediction can broadly be split into three areas: fundamental problems with the idea itself, common inconsistencies in the arguments of historicists, and the negative practical effects of implementing historicist ideas.

Fundamental problems with historicist theory

I) A description of the whole of society is impossible because the list of characteristics making up such a description would be infinite. If we cannot know the whole of the present state of mankind it follows that we cannot know the future of mankind.

“If we wish to study a thing, we are bound to select certain aspects of it. It is not possible for us to observe or to describe a whole piece of the world, or a whole piece of nature; in fact, not even the smallest whole piece may be so described, since all description is necessarily selective.”

II) Human history is a single unique event. Knowledge of the past therefore does not necessarily help one to know the future. “The evolution of life on earth, or of human society, is a unique historical process… Its description, however, is not a law, but only a singular historical statement.”

Study of history may reveal trends. However, there is no guarantee that these trends will continue. In other words: they are not laws; “a statement asserting the existence of a trend at a certain time and place would be a singular historical statement and not a universal law.”

In addition, given that historians are interested in the uniqueness of past events, it may be said that future events will possess a uniqueness that cannot be known in advance.

III) Individual human action or reaction can never be predicted with certainty, therefore neither can the future: “The human factor is the ultimately uncertain and wayward element in social life and in all social institutions. Indeed, this is the element which ultimately cannot be completely controlled by institutions (as Spinoza first saw); for every attempt at controlling it completely must lead to tyranny; which means, to the omnipotence of the human factor – the whims of a few men, or even one.”

Popper asserts that psychology cannot lead to a complete understanding of “the human factor” because “'human nature' varies considerably with the social institutions, and its study therefore presupposes an understanding of these institutions.”

IV) A law, natural (i.e. scientific) or social, may enable us to exclude the possibility of certain events but it does not allow us to narrow down the range of possible outcomes to only one. This follows from Popper’s theory of science: a hypothesis is proposed (it does not matter how the hypothesis was derived) and is then subjected to rigorous tests which aim to disprove the hypothesis. If no tests disprove the hypothesis it may become known as a law but in fact remains simply a so-far-unfalsified hypothesis.

Equally, examples of where theories are correct are useless in proving the validity of the theory.

V) It is logically impossible to know the future course of history when that course depends in part on the future growth of scientific knowledge (which is unknowable in advance).

Common inconsistencies in the arguments of historicists

I) Historicists often require the remodelling of man to become fit for the future society or hasten the arrival of this society. Given that society is composed of mankind, remaking man for a particular society can lead to any type of society. Also, a need to remodel man suggests that without this remodelling, the new society may not come about, and is therefore not inevitable.

II) Historicists are bad at imagining conditions under which an identified trend ceases. Historical generalisations may be reduced to a set of laws of higher generality (i.e. one could say that history depends upon psychology). However, in order to form predictions from these generalisations we also need specific initial conditions. To the extent that conditions change or are changing, any "law" may apply differently and trends may disappear.

III) Historicism tends to mistake historical interpretations for theories. When studying history we can only examine a limited aspect of the past. In other words, we must apply a historical interpretation. It is necessary to appreciate a plurality of valid interpretations (although some may be more fertile than others).

以上文字摘自英文维基百科「The Poverty of Historicism」(有删节,去掉了参考文献等尾部小节),按 CC BY-SA 4.0 使用,作者为维基百科的各位编者。

资料卡

原题
The Poverty of Historicism
原作语言
英语
首次出版
1957 年
首版出版社
劳特利奇
主题
历史主义、历史哲学

资料卡来自 Wikidata Q3283744(CC0),众包数据,个别字段可能不全。

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